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Abstract 
Purpose-  The purpose of the study is to empirically investigate the similarities and differences 
between dyads and four party groups in an integrative negotiation.  
Design/methodology/approach- Data are collected in a between subjects experiment. 182 
participants completed a negotiation role play and questionnaire. Hypotheses are tested using t-
tests, MANOVAs and two multiple regression analyses.  
Findings- Results demonstrate that dyads do outperform groups on both the economic and 
subjective measures of outcomes. Sharing of  priority information and the fixed pie bias was 
higher in groups than in dyads. For dyads the procedure used (considering more than one issue at 
a time) led to higher economic outcomes, and  both procedure and problem solving were 
important for subjective outcomes. For four party negotiations, problem solving was significantly 
related to higher outcomes, on both economic and subjective outcomes, and procedure was 
moderately related to economic outcomes. Problem solving was significantly more important for 
the groups than for dyads on economic outcomes.  
Research limitations/implications- The controlled experimental setting could limit the 
generalizabiltiy of the findings. Measures of the intermediate variables could be improved by 
including additional items and observations. Future research is required in field settings using 
multiple measures of the process. 
Practical implications- In multiparty negotiation information sharing and the presence  of 
cognitive biases may not be as important as focusing on a problem solving approach.  
Originality/value- An empirical investigation that groups underperform dyads in an integrative 
negotiation has not been conducted before. 
Keywords- negotiation, dyads, multiparty, group,integrative, Nash solutions 
Paper type- Research 
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1. Introduction 
In the organizational behavior field negotiation research has proliferated over the last three 
decades, with the majority of studies investigating dyads-two parties (Beersma and DeDreu, 
2002).  In recent years there has been a notable increase in the amount of research on group and 
multiparty negotiations (cf. Beersma and De Dreu, 1999, 2002, 2005; Schei and Rognes, 2005), 
however there has been virtually no studies which directly compare multiparty and dyadic 
negotiations. This lack of comparison could limit our ability to apply the wealth of research on 
dyads to larger groups in organizations. It has been argued that larger groups will underperform 
dyads in a negotiation situation (Kramer, 1991) but direct empirical tests of this hypothesis have 
not been carried out.  
Negotiations are ubiquitous in organizations. A negotiation can be understood as a type of 
decision making task or conflict resolution technique in which two or more parties, who have 
partially differing preferences, attempt to reach a joint agreement. Negotiations are different from 
other decision making tasks because parties are motivated to achieve their own interests, and at 
the same time are required to cooperate with the other party to reach a joint agreement (McGrath, 
1984).  In organizational life numerous decision situations can be characterized as mixed motive 
and many involve small groups (Brett, 1991). For example, decisions relating to, salary, 
budgeting,  alliances, purchasing, and strategic issues, where parties have non identical 
preferences. 
 In the negotiation research both group and multiparty labels have been used to refer to 
more than two parties. Group negotiation has been used to describe a myriad of activities among 
and between organizational members. For example it has been used to denote both team to team 
negotiation (cf. O'Connor, 1997; Thompson, Petterson and Brodt, 1996) and negotiations with 
more than two principals (those having a direct stake in the outcome of a negotiation) (Weingart, 
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Bennett, and Brett, 1993; Arunachalam, and Dilla, 1995;  Beersma and De Dreu, 1999, 2002, 
2005). Multiparty negotiation has also been used to describe both team to team negotiation or 
group decision  making with multiple parties (Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders, 2010).  Thompson 
and Fox (2001) created a typology of group negotiation based on seven levels of analyses: 
individual, dyad, polyad,  intermediary, collateral relationship, intragroup, and intergroup.  
Polyadic negotiation, which is the level directly above dyads, is defined by more than two 
principals. It is this specific type of group negotiation which is of interest in the present study.  In 
this paper multiparty and group labels will be used interchangeably to refer to polyadic 
negotiations where there are more than two principals. 
As the number of parties in a negotiation increase, from dyads to groups, which variables 
become more or less important for achieving good outcomes? By empirically comparing and 
contrasting dyadic and multiparty negotiations this question can be answered. The addition of 
parties to a negotiation increases the  informational, interpersonal, strategic and procedural 
complexity (Bazerman, Mannix, Sondak, and Thompson, 1990; Bazerman and Neale, 1992; 
Crump and Glendon, 2003;  Kramer, 1991) which in turn, is postulated to  lead to lower 
outcomes (Kramer, 1991). The possibility of coalition formation in multiparty negotiations is 
perhaps the most fundamental difference between dyads and groups (Thompson, 2005) and an 
important source of complexity (Polzer, Mannix, and Neale, 1999). A coalition can be defined as 
“ a (sub) group of two or more individuals who join together in using their resources to affect the 
outcome of a decision in a mixed-motive situation involving at least three parties” (Thompson, 
2005: 209). Coalitions are unique to multiparty negotiations and have received  substantial 
research attention (cf. Polzer et al., 1998; Komorita and Parks, 1995).  Studies demonstrate that 
coalitions can be either beneficial or deleterious to negotiation outcomes depending on the task 
and the motivation of the players (Beersma and De Dreu, 2002; Thompson, Mannix, and 
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Bazerman, 1988; Mannix, 1993; Ten Velden, Beersma, and  De Dreu, 2007).  Although 
coalitions are a central consideration in group negotiations, the possibility of forming coalitions 
might not always exist. Beersma and De Dreu (2002) investigated both symmetrical task 
structure (where stable coalitions across issues were not possible) versus asymmetrical 
negotiation (where stable coalitions could  be formed) and argued the importance of 
understanding both types of structures in group negotiation (Beersma and De Dreu, 2002).  
Even though coalitions are one source of dissimilarity between dyads and groups they are 
not the only difference, nor are they always present.  It is critical to examine differences and 
similarities between dyads and groups on comparable tasks (symmetrical) with the same 
structural properties and uncover whether variables and mechanisms for achieving good 
outcomes are equally important. The next section defines high quality outcomes and examines 
factors which lead to good outcomes in both dyads and groups. 
2. High quality outcomes in integrative negotiations 
The term integrative has been used in the literature to refer to, the approach or strategy (high 
concern for own and other’s outcomes), the structure of the task (variable sum), and/ or by the 
type of agreement achieved (Thompson, 2005). For the purposes of this present study an 
integrative negotiation refers to the structure of the task, which is variable sum (Raiffa, 1982) and 
introduces the possibility for an integrative solution (high joint benefit).  
Negotiation tasks are often studied and classified as fixed or variable sum. A fixed sum 
negotiation, also referred to as distributive, represents a situation where an increase in one party’s 
resources means a decrease in resources for the other party. High quality outcomes at the 
individual level are measured by how much of the limited resource a  party obtains (Lewicki, et 
al., 2010) and the quality of the joint outcome is determined by whether an agreement is reached 
when there is a positive bargaining zone and no agreement when there is a negative bargaining 
6 
 
zone. For variable sum negotiations resources are not fixed, and an increase in one party’s 
resources does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the other party’s resources. A high quality 
outcome in an integrative, variable sum task is defined as an agreement which incorporates, and 
reconciles, the parties’ interests and produces high joint benefit (Follet, 1925; Neale and 
Northcraft, 1991; Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1982; Walton and McKersie,1965). Within 
organizations many decision situations can be characterized as integrative and most negotiations 
contain a variable sum dimension (Thompson, 2005). 
In the present study I have chose to study variable sum negotiations since they are most 
relevant for organizations. In this type of negotiation the quality of the outcomes is understood as 
the degree of integrativeness of an agreement.  Integrativeness has been conceptualized and 
measured in both objective economic terms and the subjective perceptions of the parties 
involved.  
Objective measures of the integrativeness of outcomes has been greatly assisted by 
economic theories and models. In the 1940’s the field of game theory emerged which modeled 
strategic behavior in interdependent choice situations (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). 
Analysis of these games evolved to include multiparty variable sum situation and models were 
developed which identified optimal solutions (highest joint gain for rational players and most 
efficient use of resources) (Nash, 1950).  The negotiation literature combined the concept of 
integrative, high joint benefit, with exact economic models to understand and measure high 
quality outcomes.   
The quality of outcomes in integrative negotiations has been typically measured using 
joint profit, efficiency, the Pareto optimality of the agreement (cf. Bazerman, Mannix, and 
Thompson, 1988; Clyman,1995; Thompson, 1991; Tripp and Sondak, 1992) and the equality of 
the distribution of resources (Arunachalam and Dilla, 1995). Thompson et al., (1988) suggest that 
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more equal distributions among group members, when power is equal, is a desirable goal. The 
emphasis with the economic measures has been to measure high quality outcomes by the degree 
to which an agreement maximizes both  individual and joint outcome. 
Subjective measures of high quality agreement have used self report measure of social 
psychological well being, such as satisfaction and fairness perceptions (Thompson, 1990; 
Curhan, Elfenbein and Xu, 2006).   
The quality of the outcome in dyadic and group integrative negotiation can be measured 
in terms of high joint benefit, both economic and subjective. In the next section I review which 
variables and mechanisms have been identified as central for realizing these outcomes.  
3. Achieving high quality outcomes 
The majority of negotiation studies have investigated dyads and a considerable amount of 
knowledge about processes and outcomes between two parties exists, however  much less is 
known about multiple parties. Fortunately, there has been an increasing interest in group 
negotiations (Beersma and De Dreu, 1999, 2002, 2005; Olekalns, Brett and Weingart, 2003; Ten 
Velden et al, 2007).  The findings from this research generally support that variables which have 
been found to be important in dyads, such as information exchange, accurate perceptions of the 
negotiation structure, type of procedure, motivation and emotion (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, and 
Valley, 2000; Thompson, 1990, 1991, 2005;  Thompson et al. 1988; Weingart, et al, 1993) are 
also relevant for groups.  
However, what is still not known is whether these variables are of differing importance 
for dyads and groups. Based on Kramer’s (1991) propositions about the differences between 
dyads and groups (information, procedural and strategic complexity), the need for comparable 
symmetrical tasks (so that stable coalitions are not possible and dyads and groups can be 
compared on the same task structure), and the variables identified as important for integrative 
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outcomes, four central variables were chosen. Two variables associated with increased 
information complexity, information exchange and the fixed pie bias, and two variables 
associated with  procedural complexity, the agenda used and problem solving.  
Information exchange is an important component of integrative negotiation behavior as it 
can facilitate finding outcomes that are of high joint benefit (Arunachalam and Dilla, 1995; Pruitt 
and Lewis, 1975; Pinkley, Griffith, and Northcraft, 1995; Schulz and Pruitt, 1978; Thompson, 
1990; Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt, 1996 ).  Specifically, information about the negotiator’s 
priorities and preferences has been studied and shown to positively affect the quality of 
negotiation outcomes (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Pinkley et al., 1995; Schulz and Pruitt, 1978; 
Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1996).   
 Explicit information sharing has been shown to be positively associated with insight and 
joint benefit (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Pinkley, Griffith, and Northcraft, 1995; Schulz and Pruitt, 
1978; Thompson, 1990; Thompson and Hastie, 1990a; Thompson et al., 1996). Studies have 
demonstrated that even when only one party reveals information, joint outcome increases and 
there is a strong reciprocation effect (Thompson,1991; Thompson et al., 1996). In groups 
information exchange has been measured as an important integrative behavior (Beersma and De 
Dreu, 1999,2002) and shown to  mitigate judgment errors and increase outcomes (Arunchalam 
and Dilla, 1995) 
Although priority information exchange can be advantageous and give insight into the 
integrative potential of the negotiation, it may not occur naturally or at sufficient levels (Pruitt 
and Lewis, 1975; Thompson, 1991) to achieve higher outcomes. Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, 
Konar-Goldband, and Carnevale (1980) found no relationship with explicit information sharing 
and judgment accuracy or joint profit. Pinkley et al. (1995) demonstrated that explicit 
information sharing led to higher joint outcome only when parties had expectations that the 
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preference structures were variable. Pruitt and Carnevale (1982) also state that explicit 
information sharing contributes most to high quality outcomes when three conditions exist: 
negotiators are high in cognitive complexity, both have a co-operative orientation, and both have 
low accountability to a constituency. Most of the empirical studies show that explicit information 
sharing contributes to obtaining integrative agreements (Beersma and De Dreu, 1999, 2002). 
The current knowledge about information exchange and the similarities and differences  
between dyads and groups is limited. Thompson at al.’s (1996) work examining teams of 
negotiators versus solos in dyadic negotiations indicated the importance of only one member on a 
team sharing the priority information, which then set in motion the exchange of priority 
information between the parties. Implications are that in multiparty negotiations if one party 
initiates the sharing of priority information then this action will lead others to share their 
information.  Knowing that priority information is an important integrative behaviour and has 
been related to higher outcomes, it is time now to investigate and compare the natural emergence 
of explicit information exchange in dyads and groups. 
The increase in information complexity in multiparty negotiations can also lead to more 
cognitive biases. Research has demonstrated that many judgment errors are present in 
negotiations (cf. Bazerman and Chugh, 2006;  Bazerman and Neale, 1983; Thompson and Hastie, 
1990ab), and that these biases are linked with lower negotiation outcomes (Arunachalam and 
Dilla, 1995; Thompson and Hastie, 1990a; Thompson, 1991). The judgment errors or biases 
found in dyadic negotiation are many: the impact of framing (Bottom and Studt, 1993; De Dreu 
and McCusker, 1997; Neale and Bazerman, 1985), the “fixed pie” bias ( Bazerman, Magliozzi, 
and Neale, 1985; Thompson and DeHarpport, 1994; Thompson and Hastie, 1990b), the anchoring 
effect (Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001; Ritov, 1996;  Whyte and Sebenius, 1997), 
overconfidence (Bazerman, Moore, and Gillespie, 1999), falsely assume preference 
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incompatibility (Thompson and Hrebec, 1996), and the  self serving biases (Babcock and 
Lowenstein, 1997). Among the biases studied, the fixed pie, falsely assuming a distributive 
negotiation when the potential for integrative solutions exist, is one of the most problematic  and 
common biases in integrative agreements (cf. Bazerman et al, 2000). No research to my 
knowledge,  has empirically investigated whether the fixed pie bias is more or less likely to occur 
in group negotiations. From a behavioral decision perspective, the increases in information 
complexity in multiparty  negotiations would lead to an increased prevalence of biases in groups 
compared to dyads. Are biases more prevalent in groups than dyads? 
Procedural complexity has also been assumed to grow as the number of parties increase, 
escalating the challenges of coordination and communication (Bazerman et al. 1988; Bazerman 
and Neale, 1992; Kramer, 1991).  A robust finding from the literature is the way in which 
negotiators structure the negotiation process, the procedure, can have a large impact on 
integrative outcomes. The consideration of issues and decision rules, have been found to greatly 
affect the outcomes in a negotiation (cf. Thompson, 2005). Studies at the group and dyadic level 
have shown that integrative solutions occur more often when a simultaneous rather than 
sequential (one by one) consideration of issues occurs (Mannix et al., 1989; Weingart et al., 
1993; Yukl et al., 1976). Most of the research has manipulated the type of agenda of the parties 
rather than observing which type of agenda emerges. At present there is little research that 
informs us how the addition of more parties to a negotiation, affects the type of agenda which 
emerges. 
In addition to managing the agenda, negotiating units, can adopt integrative behaviors to 
tackle procedural complexity.  A problem solving approach which reflects concern for both self 
and others interests, is a type of integrative behavior (Beersma and De Dreu, 2002).  Problem 
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solving approaches highlight the cooperative, not the competitive aspects of negotiations and 
have been associated with high joint outcomes in integrative negotiations (Beersma and De Dreu, 
2002; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1982;  Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Walton and McKersie, 1965).  No 
research has directly compared whether this type of behavior is more or less prevalent in dyads or 
groups, nor if it is equally important for both. 
The four variables mentioned above have been found to contribute to high quality 
integrative agreements in negotiations, and have been shown to be important for both dyadic and 
group negotiation.  However, research is needed that investigates how these variables manifest 
themselves in dyads and groups. Do these variables emerge similarly in dyads and groups, and 
are they of equal importance for groups and dyads to achieve high quality outcomes? 
 4. Hypotheses 
Six hypotheses were proposed to investigate similarities and differences between dyadic and 
group negotiation. The first hypothesis tests whether groups reach lower joint outcomes than 
dyads in an integrative negotiation task. Due to the combined increases in complexity, as argued 
for by Bazerman et al. (1988) and  Kramer  (1991), the hypothesis proposed is that that groups 
will achieve lower outcomes than dyads.  To check that group and dyadic differences held across 
negotiation tasks two symmetrical negotiation tasks were used with a varied number of issues to 
be negotiated (four or ten).  
H1: Groups will achieve lower outcomes than dyads in an integrative negotiation across 
negotiation tasks. 
The next four hypotheses explored differences between dyads and groups in: explicit 
information sharing, fixed pie bias, procedure (consideration of issues) and problem solving. All 
hypotheses are presented as null hypotheses that groups and dyads do not differ. 
12 
 
In a multiparty negotiation the amount of information that can be exchanged and the 
information required to reach an integrative outcome is higher than in a similar dyadic 
negotiation.  How does this increase affect groups in their explicit sharing of priority 
information?  It could be argued that individuals will have less time to share information in a 
group than in a dyad, which in turn would reduce the exchange of priority information. 
Alternatively, groups are more likely to have at least one member share his/her priority 
information since there are additional parties involved. From Thompson et al’s (1996) work there 
is empirical evidence that if one member shares information this can lead to a snowball effect in 
which other parties also share their information.  The null hypothesis presented is:  
H2.  There will be no differences between groups and dyads in the sharing of  priority 
information. 
From a behavioral decision perspective, as complexity of the decision making task 
increases the use of heuristics increases (Payne, 1993).  Based on this theory it is expected that 
the fixed pie bias would be present to a higher degree in groups than in dyads.  However, a 
dyadic negotiation task might be sufficiently complex that it evokes the use of the  fixed pie bias. 
The null hypothesis is: 
H3.   Groups and dyads will have the same degree of the fixed pie bias. 
Kramer (1991) postulated that the increased procedural complexity was a primary reason 
for lower outcomes in group negotiation. In negotiations the complexity of the task greatly 
increases when deliberating all the issues at once. The increased procedural complexity of a 
group negotiation with more people and more preferences to take into account, could lead to 
difficulty in processing all the information. To reduce the complexity groups might be more 
likely to adopt a procedure that reduces the information load, such as using sequential agendas. 
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However, a dyadic negotiation might be complex enough so that parties resort to using sequential 
agendas. To investigate this the null hypothesis is: 
H4. Groups and dyads will use the same degree of sequential agendas.  
Groups have been shown to face many challenges in the negotiation process. There could 
be more occasions for conflict, more uncertainly and negotiators might perceive that they have 
less control over the process (Kramer, 1991). Bazerman et al, (1988) also propose that it is more 
difficult to problem solve than to compete.  With increases in the number of people the need to 
simplify could lead to a less cooperative approach. Alternatively the group context could cue 
more cooperative behavior since it might not be clear who is competing with whom. 
H 5. Dyads and groups will use equal levels of problem solving. 
Lastly, to investigate whether these four variables are equally important for dyads and 
groups to reach high quality outcomes a null hypothesis is put forward. 
H 6 The intermediate variables  (information exchange,  fixed pie bias, procedure, and 
problem solving) will be equally important for dyads and groups to reach high quality 
outcomes. 
5. Method 
Participants and design 
182 participants from undergraduate business courses, or a seminar on negotiations took part in 
the study.  The sample was collected from three educational institutions and one placement 
agency for students. To ensure that collecting the data from the different institutions did not 
affect the intermediate and dependent variables, one way ANOVAs were run. The results were 
non-significant for all the variables and showed no systematic differences across data collection 
sites.  
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The design was a simple post test only design between dyads and groups. The negotiating 
unit was the unit of analysis. The dependent variables were economic and subjective social 
psychological outcomes and the intermediate variables were used as dependent and independent 
variables. 
Procedure 
A total of five sessions were run with the number of participants in each session ranging 
from 18 to 60.  The same experimenter was present in each data collection meeting. The 
researcher arrived at each class or seminar and began by giving the participants a short 
introduction to the session. The introduction stated that they would be divided into groups, and 
would be negotiating with either one or three others in a negotiation role-play and that afterwards 
they would receive a lecture on negotiations. After the introduction, subjects were divided into 
male and female subgroups and the number of groups and dyads possible was determined.  For 
example, if there were six females in a subgroup one dyad and one group could be formed. 
Participants were randomly assigned to dyadic or group conditions and to a negotiating role. No 
significant differences on outcomes or intermediate variables for gender were detected, so no 
further analysis involving gender was conducted.   
 The participants were told that they would receive a confidential preference sheet, which 
would give them a role and preferences on each alternative in the role play.  Preferences for the 
different alternatives were indicated by points, which in turn represented the amount of profit 
associated with each alternative. The profit each role could earn for their respective department in 
the organization was represented by the number of points. In the role play the participants were 
told that reaching agreement would be better than the alternative of no agreement. They were 
instructed to read through the confidential preference sheet, and not to show this information to 
any other person.   
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 The participants were given fifteen minutes to read through the general information 
describing the simulation which explained the roles, the issues to be negotiated, and the 
alternatives on each issue. At the end of the fifteen minutes they were asked if they had any 
questions.  Pretests were conducted and it was deemed fifty minutes was enough time required to 
complete the different versions of the negotiation task. After finishing the negotiation they were 
asked to fill out the agreement they had reached and to individually complete the questionnaire. If 
groups were still negotiating fifteen minutes before time was out in the negotiation, they were 
told they had fifteen minutes to finish. They were then instructed to complete the questionnaire 
which took approximately ten minutes. Afterwards, participants were debriefed, thanked, and 
given a lecture on negotiation. 
Negotiation tasks and manipulation of group and dyad 
Negotiation role plays were specifically created which were symmetrical in structure and 
could be used for both dyads and groups.  Previous negotiation tasks used for dyads (cf. Kelley, 
1966; Kimmel et al. 1980; and Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Thompson and Hastie, 1990), and groups 
(Arunachalam and Dilla, 1995; Beersma and De Dreu, 2002) are built on structural and 
conceptual similarities to the task created by Kelley (1966) and developed by Pruitt and Lewis 
(1975) and Carnevale and Pruitt (1992). However, to my knowledge there has not been any 
negotiating task that has been designed and used both for comparing dyads and groups. In this 
study I created four negotiation tasks which were similar in structure (the number of alternatives, 
symmetrical, no stable coalition formation across issues possible), but differed in terms of the 
number of negotiators (two or four), issues (four or ten), and number of trades necessary to 
achieve an integrative agreement (one, two, and four).  The number of issues and trades were 
varied in order to ensure results were not due to the specific task used. A two-way ANOVA 
(dyadic/group, by four and ten issues task) was run and no significant differences between the 
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four and ten issue tasks were found on the dependent variables.  The profit schedules given to the 
participants  represented their utilities allowing economic outcomes to be calculated. The role 
plays were designed so that economic outcomes could be measured using a Nash solution which 
facilitated comparisons across dyads and groups and tasks.  
 Across all simulations a symmetrical structure, similar to many other dyadic negotiation 
and group simulations, was used. Symmetrical task structures do not allow for stable coalitions 
across the issues (Beersma and De Dreu, 2002).  For example, if there are four issues and four 
negotiators on each issue, the  structure of the task does not make it advantageous for three of the 
parties to join together.  In addition, preference alignment with the different roles change. For 
example, Role A on issue one would be aligned with Role C, and on issue two with Role D . 
 The setting of the role play was a leader meeting in a pharmaceutical company. There 
were either two roles in the dyadic condition or four roles in the group condition, and each role 
was a leader of a department in the organization. The departments in the dyadic condition were 
finance and research and development, and for the multiparty condition two additional 
departments were added,  marketing and production. The leader group was instructed to reach 
agreement on either four or ten management issues. They were told that they should reach 
agreement otherwise a decision would be made by outside consultants and the outcome would be 
worse that any agreement they could achieve together (making their reservation point zero). The 
issues included reporting in the company, production responsibility, location, marketing 
campaign, distribution of their products, a director candidate, and division of the profit.  On each 
issue there were nine alternatives which were constructed with a logical sequence of decreasing 
or increasing utility.  Each role received a profit schedule that gave information about the role’s 
profits (represented by a number of points) for each alternative on each issue, but no information 
was given about the other roles’ profits.  The role’s preferences were represented by profits 
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(points) their department would attain if they reached an agreement with a particular combination 
of alternatives. In the four issues negotiation the roles could achieve agreements between 0 – 11 
250  points each and in the ten issue outcomes ranged from 0 - 28 050.  
 The task allowed for negotiators to integrate their interests through logrolling (trading a 
less valuable issue for a more valuable issue). In the four issue task all four issues could be 
traded.  In the ten issue negotiation task eight issues could be traded.  A Nash solution could be 
calculated for dyads and groups in both tasks.    
6. Measures 
Integrative agreements 
Integrative agreements were measured using the objective economic performance of the 
negotiating units and subjective social psychological perceptions. As stated previously integrative 
agreements are defined as those that reconcile the parties’ interests and produce high benefit for 
all parties (Follet, 1925; Neale and Northcraft, 1991; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1982).  The Nash 
solution gives a bargaining solution that includes both the actions of rational and self interested 
players and the joint fairness of the agreement (Bovens, 1987; Nash,1950; Tripp and Sondak, 
1992) and was used to measure economic outcomes.  The Nash solution has been used previously 
(Eliasberg, LaTour, Rangaswamy and Stern, 1986;  Greenhalgh and Neslin; 1983; Greenhalgh, 
Neslin, and Gilkey, 1985) and best represents an optimal solution for parties with equal power. In 
the negotiation literature integrative agreements have often been defined and operationalized by 
using either joint profit or economic efficiency or Pareto optimality (cf. Bazerman, et al., 1988; 
Clyman, 1995; and Thompson 1990, 1991). Although joint profit has been criticized for lacking a 
theoretical foundation, there has been little debate about whether the theoretically robust 
economic efficiency criterion is sufficient to understand the integrativeness of an agreement. The 
disadvantage with only assessing individual utility maximization and the efficiency of 
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agreements is that valuable information is lost about the distribution of resources and the 
maximum benefit to both parties. Key to understanding integrative agreements is the emphasis on  
joint benefit not just individual maximization.  In some negotiation tasks a high Pareto efficient 
score can represent a very uneven distribution of resources and mirror a distributive agreement, 
where one party gains a great deal more than the other party. The role plays were designed so that 
one Nash solution was possible for each role play which represents individual rationality, highest 
joint benefit, and symmetry. For this type of task, with the equal power of the roles, a Nash 
solution represents both a theoretically and practically relevant measure for high joint benefit in 
the group.1
Some negotiating groups did not reach an agreement. Previously negotiating units who 
reached an impasse have been excluded from analysis or not reported (Beersma and DeDreu 
1998; Mannix et al. 1989),  given a numeric score based on either reservation points (Carnevale 
and Lawler, 1986) or  compromise solutions (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975) or given the lowest agreed 
outcome (Beersma and De Dreu, 2002; Kimmel et al., 1980) or a score of zero (Yukl et al, 1976).  
There has not been a systematic approach to treating impasses in the negotiation research. 
 
                                            
1  The Nash solution maximizes the product of the parties’ outcomes.  To calculate the solution requires that 
the utilities be rescaled to the utility of the point where the negotiator would prefer no settlement.  The no settlement 
point in the role plays are zero.  In the negotiation task there was one Nash solution for each task and agreements 
were calculated by the distance from this solution. For example, for the four issue dyad role play the calculation 
would be  , where x is equal to the party 1’s score and y equals party 2’s score. The  Nash solution would be  
  where scores of 7500 for each party is the solution for maximizing the product of both parties. The  
Nash solution is therefore 7500 points.  All agreements in the research were measured as the distance from the 
unique Nash solution for each task.  The scores were then standardized and reversed for ease of interpretation.  For 
example, if in the dyadic four issues negotiation party 1 received a profit score of 6000 and party 2 received a profit 
score of 3750.  The distance of this agreement  from the Nash solution  is calculated by simply 
subtracting    from ,  (7500 -   = 4743.42). The score for this example would be (7550 - 
4743)  =  2757.  In this example, I set the Nash solution and dyad scores to one by dividing both solutions by 7500 so 
scores are comparable across tasks. This gives the result of 36.75.  Finally, the score was reversed so higher scores 
represented higher quality outcomes. In this example the dyadic outcome was 63.25 which reflects the percentage of 
the Nash solution (the maximum outcome) the agreement obtained. If a dyad achieved the Nash solution of 7500 
they would receive a score of 100. For group negotiation tasks the same procedure was used to calculate distances 
except that a root of four (  ) was used (maximizing all four parties). 
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Deciding on how to treat impasses is both a theoretical and statistical issue and one that demands 
more attention (Tripp and Sondak, 1992).  Theoretically, I was concerned that the measure 
accurately reflected the quality of the negotiation outcomes and therefore it was imperative that 
non agreements were included in the analysis. If impasses were excluded a selection bias in the 
results would have been created and meaningful information and power would  have been lost 
from the analysis. From a statistical perspective, if there is a differential rate of impasse across 
conditions,  assigning impasses a score of zero causes increased heterogeneity of variance, which 
can lead to problems interpreting the results (Yukl, et al. 1976).  Based on theoretical, statistical, 
experimental considerations, and previous studies, impasse information was included in the 
calculation of economic outcomes and  I report both a parametric test where negotiating units 
were given the lowest score achieved in the sample (a point furthest away from the Nash 
solution) which is consistent with previous research (Beersma and De Dreu, 2002; Kimmel et al., 
1980) and also a non parametric test where negotiating units were given a zero score, which is 
compatible with their reservation points and previous research and does not pose problems of 
interpretation. 
 A post negotiation questionnaire was used to measure both the subjective social 
psychological outcomes and intermediate variables. The negotiating unit, dyad or group, served 
as the unit of analysis and measures were both at the negotiation unit and individual levels.  
Missing data at the individual level accounted for less than six percent of the sample, and showed 
no systematic differences between the conditions. As there is no commonly accepted criteria for 
the response rates of group level data, I deemed that at least fifty percent of the negotiating unit 
had to respond in order to measure the group level. Previous research has used thirty-three 
percent response rate to measure the group level  (Vodosek, 2007). Given the nature of the data, 
the small number of missing items at the individual level and previous research I used the 
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averages from individual data, to estimate group level scores. There was no missing data for the 
group level measures.  
 A five item scale, derived from the general negotiation literature and similar to those used 
by Shapiro and Bies (1994),  measured subjective social psychological outcomes.  Five questions 
addressed the individual’s satisfaction and perceptions of fairness with the negotiation by asking 
how satisfied or how fair they thought the negotiation was.  A five point  scale (1= dissatisfied 
and 5= satisfied, and 1= unfair and 5 = fair respectively).  The scores on each question were 
summed to create a group level indicator of the negotiation unit and then an average was used to 
standardize the scores across dyads and groups. A higher score represented higher subjective 
social psychological outcomes in the unit. The Cronbach’s alpha for these items was α = .78.  I 
ran a one way ANOVA to check that there was more variation between groups than within 
groups on social psychological outcome and found more variation between groups indicating a 
group level phenomenon: (F (59, 115) =1.75, p < .006).   
Intermediate variables. Intermediate variables were measured with a post negotiation 
questionnaire.  Previous research has measured negotiation behavior either by coding verbal 
transcripts (Adair, Okumura and Brett, 2001;  Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Weingart et al, 1993) or 
through self or peer reports (Beersma and De Dreu, 1999;  Beersma and De Dreu, 2002). A post 
negotiation questionnaire was chosen, with self and peer reports, to measure both behaviors and 
perceptions. Our two behavioral intermediate variables, were  information exchange, and 
procedure. In groups and dyads participants were asked whether they shared which issue was 
most important for them. Answers were either yes or no. A group score represented the 
percentage of the group who shared priority information.  
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Three items were used to measure the degree to which groups and dyads considered issues 
simultaneous or sequentially. Respondents were asked to report the behavior of the group. 
Answers could be given on a five point scale where 1= to a small degree and 5= to a large degree. 
The higher the score, the more the procedure could be characterized as simultaneous 
consideration of issues. The three items were: the group decided to go through the negotiation 
issue by issue (reversed score); members in the group traded issues (I will give you issue 2 if you 
give me issue 4); and the group agreed to decide on more than one issue at a time. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for these items was α = .85.  Before aggregating the individual items to the 
group level I ran a one way ANOVAs to check that there was more variation between groups 
than within groups. I found that on all three items there was more variation between than within 
groups indicating that there was a group level phenomenon: sequential issue consideration (F (59, 
111)  =  3.241,  p < .000;  traded issues (F (59, 113)  =  6.953,  p<000;  and, agreeing on more 
than one issue at a time F (59, 113) = 8.79,  p  < .000.  
The problem solving variable was assessed by having individuals in the negotiating unit 
recall the degree to which the negotiation process in the dyad or group could be described as 
constructive problem solving. Using a five point  scale with 1= small degree and 5= to a large 
degree, the problem solving approach in the group was measured.  A higher score represented a 
greater degree of problem solving. Negotiating unit scores were computed by calculating the 
average for the unit from individual reports. Although only one item was used to measure 
problem solving there were two to four informants on this variable. Reliability was assessed by 
examining the agreement among the individuals in the unit.  A one way ANOVA demonstrated 
that perceptions within the units were more similar (F (59, 111) = 1 .89, p =.002) than between 
the units . 
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To measure the presence of the fixed pie bias past researchers have asked subjects about 
the other parties’ priorities (Carnevale and Isen, 1986; Kimmel et al., 1980; and Thompson and 
Hastie, 1990a). The measure chosen for this study is similar to one used in Arunachalam and 
Dilla, (1995) and Thompson and Hastie (1990a). To calculate the group level measure of the 
fixed pie bias respondents were asked whether other parties in the role play had the same priority 
issue as they did. This general question indicates whether the respondents thought of the 
negotiation as fixed or variable. At the individual level the answers were either yes or no, a 
correct answer was no. The role play was structured so that no other party had the same most 
important issue. At the group level a fixed pie bias score was computed based on the  percentage 
of members who had incorrectly answered yes. Summing individual scores to calculate the 
degree of  accuracy in dyads and groups has been used in previous studies (Arunachalam and 
Dilla, 1995; Thompson, 1991; Thompson and Hastie, 1990a).  Although a conservative measure 
of bias, the group score correlated significantly with joint profit (r2=.-28, p<.032) indicating the 
validity of this measure in relation to previous research.  
7. Results 
Treatment of the Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Outcome data were first analyzed using two-way (group/dyad)  x  (task four/ten issues) ANOVAs 
for both economic and subjective social psychological outcomes. The effect of task type proved 
not to be significant and will not be discussed or analyzed further. Differences between dyads and 
groups on the dependent variables were analyzed using t-tests. Differences between dyads and 
groups on the intermediate variables (priority information sharing, fixed pie bias, procedure and  
problem solving) were analyzed using a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) . Two 
sub-group multiple linear regressions were run to investigate which intermediate variables were 
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most important for achieving high quality outcomes in dyads and groups. Table 1 provides the 
descriptive statistics for all the intermediate and dependent variables. Consistent with past 
research, simultaneous consideration of issues and problem solving  were positively related to 
economic outcomes, and fixed pie perceptions were negatively related to economic outcomes.   
 
Insert Table 1 
 
Economic and social psychological subjective outcomes 
One tail t-tests were run to test  hypothesis 1, which predicted that groups would achieve 
lower outcomes than dyads in an integrative negotiation. Four impasses occurred in the dyad 
condition and ten in the group condition.  A chi squared test showed there were no significant 
differences in impasse rates between the conditions.  Impasses were given the lowest negotiated 
score (Beersma and De Dreu, 2002; Kimmel et al. 1980).  Hypothesis 1 was supported (t (58)  = 
1.76,  p  = .041), dyads achieved higher economic outcomes measured as distance towards the 
Nash solution  (M = 77.9  SD = 8.91) than groups (M = 73.89  SD = 8.65) with a Cohen’s d= .46. 
A Mann-Whitney two-sample rank-sum test was also run where impasses were given a 0 score 
and results were significant (U = 330, 500,  z = 1.77,  p  = .038 (one-tail).  Significant differences 
between conditions were also found when economic outcomes were measured with joint profit (t 
(58) = 1.8,  p  = .039) and impasses were substituted with the lowest score, and using a Mann-
Whitney two-sample rank-sum test with impasses given 0  (U= 324, 500) z = 1.86, p= .031 (one-
tail). 
Hypothesis 1 was supported for the subjective outcomes, dyads (M = 3.60, SD = .54) and 
groups (M = 3.30, SD = .32), t (58) = 2.60. p = .013 (one tailed),  d=.78 . When impasses were 
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excluded from analysis there were no significant differences between dyads and groups on 
economic or subjective outcomes, however results were in the predicted direction. 
For hypotheses 2 to 5, a MANOVA was run to examine whether dyads and groups 
differed in the emergence of the intermediate variables associated with high quality outcomes in 
negotiations. The overall multivariate model was significant, Wilk’s = (.41),  F (4, 55) = 19.91,  
p <. 000,  with an effect size η2  = .59.  The null hypotheses 2 and 3 were rejected. A higher 
percentage of members in groups (M = 68.55,  SD = 31.6) shared priority information compared 
to dyads (M = 44.83,  SD = 43) although the effect size of  η2=.09 was small. Even though groups 
shared the most important issues they still had a higher degree of the fixed pie bias (M = 63.16,  
SD = 28.06) than dyads (M =12.07, SD=21.77) with an effect size of η2 = .51.  No significant 
differences were found between dyads and groups in the type of procedure followed or the 
perception of problem solving behavior, so the null hypotheses 4 and 5 could not be rejected.  
Insert Table 2 
 
 Hypothesis 6 tested whether intermediate variables were equally important for achieving 
high quality outcomes in dyads and groups. Two sub-group multiple regressions were run for 
dyads and groups with the intermediate variables of information sharing, fixed pie bias, 
procedure and problem solving acting as independent variables. Both sub group regressions were 
significant for economic outcomes (dyads F (4,24) = 4.52 , p = .011, r2 = .31 and groups F (4,26) 
= 3.73, p = .016,  r2 = .27)  and for social psychological subjective outcomes (dyads F (4,24) = 
5.9,  p = .011, r2 = . 41. and groups F (4,26)  = 6.1,  p = .001,  r2=. 41).   
Procedure was significant for dyads on both economic (β = .63,  p =.001, t (24,4)  = 3.81) 
and subjective outcomes(β = .34, p=.002, t (24) = 2.25), and problem solving (β= .55,  p =.002, t 
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(24) = 3.56) for subjective outcomes. For groups only problem solving was significant for both 
economic (β = .47, p =.007, t (26) = 2.93)  and subjective outcomes (β= .70,  p =.000, t (26,4) = 
4.87).  However, procedure was approaching significance for groups on economic outcomes (β 
= .37, p =.07, t (26) = 1.90).   
To compare whether the variables that were equally important for groups and dyads t-tests 
were used to examine the differences between dyad and group coefficients.  A significant 
difference was only found between the coefficients for problem solving on economic outcomes t 
(58,2)= 4.64,  p  > .01.  
Insert Table 3 
 
8. Discussion  
In this study I compared two and four party integrative negotiations to gain insight into whether 
dyads outperform groups on similar negotiation tasks. The results on both economic and 
subjective social psychological measures supported this theoretical claim. Interestingly these 
results occurred without the added complexity of coalition formation, a central factor often cited 
to explain why groups might achieve less than dyads in a negotiation (Kramer, 1991; Mannix, 
1993).  
A closer look at the analysis reveals that although dyads did attain higher joint outcomes 
than groups, the differences were not large. When I removed the impasses from analysis the 
differences between dyads and groups became non-significant although they were in the expected 
direction. This was true for both the economic and subjective outcomes. Poorer outcomes in a 
group negotiation appear to be a combination of impasses and lower performance.  
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Hypotheses 2-5 investigated whether intermediate variables emerged equally in dyads and 
groups. Of the four intermediate variables studied only priority information and the fixed pie bias 
were significantly different between dyads and groups. Problems solving behavior was reported 
approximately equally in both dyads and groups, as was the level of simultaneous procedure (see 
table 2). Groups shared more priority information and had more of the fixed pie bias than dyads. 
The increase in priority information sharing is consistent with previous research which has found 
that if one person shares information then a snowballing effect occurs  (Thompson and Hastie, 
1990; Thompson, 1991; Thompson et al., 1996). On the one hand this is good news for group 
negotiations, priority information is being exchanged.  On the other hand this information sharing 
was not enough to lead to higher outcomes for groups.  The finding of more bias in groups is 
commensurate with the negotiation and behavioral decision research (cf. Bazerman and Chugh, 
2006; Kramer 1991; and Payne, 1993) which demonstrates that increases in information 
complexity, increase the prevalence of cognitive biases. 
After examining the differential emergence of these central intermediate variables, I then 
explored the effect that these variables had on the quality of negotiation outcomes.  The results 
for dyads showed that the procedure used (considering more than one issue at a time) led to 
higher economic outcomes, and that both procedure and problem solving were important for 
subjective outcomes. For multiparty negotiations, problem solving was significantly related to 
higher outcomes, on both economic and subjective outcomes, and procedure was moderately 
related to economic outcomes. Problem solving has been cited as a central integrative behavior in 
the negotiation literature and appears to be especially important for groups (cf. Beersma and De 
Dreu 2002).   
 Comparing dyadic and group negotiations showed that there are both similarities and 
differences in the intermediate variables which emerge, and how important these behaviors are 
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for achieving integrative outcomes.  Consistent with prior research, both dyads and groups 
improved their economic performance when they used a procedure that considered more than one 
issue at a time (Thompson, 2005; Weingart et al. 1993).  Both dyads and groups benefited from a 
problem solving approach but interestingly, for dyads this was true only for the subjective 
outcomes not for economic outcomes where the relationship was non significant and negative. 
Problem solving was the only intermediate variable which differentially affected high quality 
economic outcomes for dyads and groups.  
Several implications for management can be identified from the current study. The finding 
that dyads do outperform groups in a negotiation may require managers to focus on specific 
interventions for group negotiations. Interventions for groups should be directed towards 
procedures that emphasize groups reaching agreement, and group level goals that focus on the 
common interests in the organization. Management support should be directed at helping groups 
to avoid impasses. For example, in more complicated multiparty negotiations where quality 
solutions are sought, one recommendation is to reach a first agreement. A first agreement is one 
that can be modified, developed and upgraded (Lewicki et al. 2010). Other methods can be to 
assign a chairperson and draft tentative agreements (Lewicki et al. 2010).  
To improve performance, structuring the group process and fostering a problem solving 
approach appears to be most important for groups. Groups share more information than dyads but 
do not seems to reap the benefits.  Priority information needs not only to be shared but also used. 
Prior research demonstrated that structuring the group negotiation process and having  parties 
actively use the information shared was associated with higher outcomes (Arunachalam and 
Dilla,1995) . Another central part of organizing the process is the agenda followed.  Managers 
need to encourage both dyads and groups to consider  packages rather proceed issue by issue in 
the negotiation.  The negotiation literature has argued that organizing the process will be more 
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critical for groups (Bazerman et al., 1988 and Kramer, 1991) and the results from this study 
support this claim.   
The final implication is that managers need to recognize the importance of problem 
solving for groups. Creating a group process that emphasizes cooperation and constructive 
problem solving can help groups find more integrative agreements. This finding might be related 
to the literature emphasizing that group norms can be critical in multiparty negotiations  (Lewicki 
et al. 2010).  Perhaps group negotiations will benefit more from norms rooted in a problem 
solving approach, rather than interventions that reduce biases. 
 
Limitations and suggestions for future work 
There are several limitations in this study. First, the self report measures used for the intermediate 
variables could lead to biases in reporting and common source bias. However, in the current 
study I have used aggregated data which helps reduce random error and increase reliability. 
Research also suggests that recall of past behavior tends to be quite accurate (Pearson, Ross, and 
Dawes, 1992).  Second, using a questionnaire after the negotiation does not allow for causal 
inferences about the intermediate variables and the outcomes variables, and therefore the 
direction of the relationship between problem solving and outcomes cannot be ascertained. 
Groups that performed well might have perceived that they used more problem solving. Third, 
some of measures could be improved.  For example information sharing only asked whether a 
party told their most important issue, but it did not measure whether others actually registered 
this information. The measure might not have been sensitive to the information sharing actually 
taking place in the negotiation. Future research should use observation as well as surveys to 
capture the information communicated, received and used. Fourth, using a laboratory experiment 
with students to understand the complexity of dyadic and group negotiation limits the 
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generalizability of my findings. Future research should study these groups and dyads in a field 
setting, using managers and executives with experience. Real life group negotiations are much 
more complex than the role play situation used in this study.  The benefit of using the experiment 
is that a direct comparison between dyads and groups was possible and interesting differences 
were identified.  The current study helps to empirically support the assumption that groups do 
underperform dyads. Future research needs to build on these findings and investigate which 
additional factors might influence the outcomes in a real life negotiation.   
What works in dyads, also works well in groups, however the emphasis with groups 
should be on getting them to reach agreement and to use problem solving behavior along the way.  
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 Table 1  Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Group/dyad a 1.48 .50       
2. Economic outcomes  75.83 8.94 .23+      
3. Subjective outcomes 3.42 .46 .33* .34*     
4. Priority information sharing 57.08 39.08 -.31* .02 .04    
5. Degree of fixed pie bias 38.47 35.90 -.72* -.22+ -.28+ .16   
6. Procedure  2.09 1.10 .10 .50* .28+ .12 -.37*  
7. Problem solving 3.21 .79 .21 .26+ .65* .15 -.16 .15 
a 1= group 2= dyad  + p<.10 , *  p<-05. 
 
 
Table 2 MANOVA of the process variables   
Variable Dyad 
(n = 29) 
Group 
(n = 31) 
df F η2 P  
Group/ Dyad M SD M SD 4 19.09 .59 .00** . 
Priority information sharing 44.83 43 68.55 31.6 1 5.99 .09 .02*  
Degree of fixed pie bias 12.07 21.77 63.16 28.06 1 61.48 .51 .00**  
Procedure  2.21 1.14 1.98 1.06 1 .62 .01 .43  
Problem Solving 3.4 .94 3.05 .60 1 2.64 .04 .11  
*  significant p<.05 ** significant p<.01. 
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Table 3 Sub group regression analyses for dyads and groups 
 Variables  Dyads  Groups 
  Economic Subjective  Economic Subjective 
  β R2 β R2  β R2 β R2 
Intermediate variables   .31  .41   .27  .41 
 Priority information sharing  .14  -.015   -.10  -.10  
 Degree of fixed pie bias  .03  -.077   .076  -.056  
 Procedure   .63**  .341*   .37+  -.116  
 Problem solving  -.10  .55**   .47**  .70**  
Note   +  p < .10, .*p < .05., **p ≤ .001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
